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Stanford and Wilkins: International Law, Due
Process, Children and the Death Penalty
A Case Note by Andre Ramon Soleil*
INTRODUCTION
The United States Supreme Court provided an answer to the
question of whether the death penalty should apply to children
convicted as adults. Their answer is yes for child murderers ages
sixteen and seventeen, and no for children who are younger. In its
answer, the Court used Eighth Amendment jurisprudence, while
failing to analyze the applicability of the death penalty to children
under the Constitution's Fourteenth Amendment, for substantive
due process, or under treaty provisions, as mandated under the
Constitution's Article Six Supremacy Clause.
This note focuses on the matters of Kevin Stanford and Heath
Wilkins. The first section of this article will discuss the preceden-
tial cases in this area of law: Stanford v. Kentucky,' Wilkins v. Mis-
soui,2 and Thompson v. Oklahoma3 . In that section, the crimes of
Kevin Stanford, Heath Wilkins and William Thompson will be de-
scribed, and their course through our judiciary to their legal fate
summarized. Particular attention will be paid to the Court's focus
on the Eighth Amendment "cruel and unusual" analysis. This arti-
cle does not criticize the Court's analysis on the issues that it chose
to consider, but focuses on constitutional precedents the Court
failed to consider in making their determination.
The second section of this article explores the state of death
penalty law in the federal jurisdiction, throughout the fifty states
generally, and in Kentucky, Missouri, Oklahoma and New York spe-
cifically. Kentucky, Missouri and Oklahoma are particularly scruti-
nized because these are the states from which the precedents arise.
New York is scrutinized because it is the home state of your author,
his law school, and his anticipated practice.
Section three suggests that the Court's analysis regarding Ke-
,in Stanford and Heath Wilkins' fates was incomplete and fatally
flawed: both Stanford and Wilkins were returned to their states'
death row. Two approaches are taken to find a breach of Kevin
* J.D., 2002, City University of New York School of Law.
492 U.S. 361 (1989).
2 Id.
3 487 U.S. 815 (1988).
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Stanford and Heath Wilkins' constitutional and federal right, as
children, to be free from the judgment of death for their crimes.
The first approach is a historic discussion of the Court's jurispru-
dence regarding the constitutional rights of children generally and
the duty the state owes a child when it takes that child into its cus-
tody, a duty that prevents the state from seeking to execute or exe-
cuting a child for their criminal acts. The second approach applies
a positive federal right of children, as found in international and
treaty law, that forbids the government from seeking a child's
death.
This note concludes that imposing death on any child, as a
sentence for any crime, violates the due process clause of the Four-
teenth Amendment and that capital punishment exercised on a
child deprives that child of his/her liberty interest in obtaining
protection and guidance from his/her family and the state, without
serving any compelling state interest. Also, the Supremacy Clause
of the Constitution, which provides that, ". . . all Treaties made...
under the Authority of the United States, shall be the supreme Law
of the Land . . .,"' creates a constitutional protection for minors,
thereby forbidding any state from sentencing to death or executing
children.
Upon taking custody of a child for any reason, the state takes
on the duty of guiding that child to maturity. This duty, along with
international and federal treaty law, forbids the state from acting in
a manner that prevents a child from attaining maturity, and partic-
ularly forbids the state from seeking the demise of or killing a
child. Therefore, the Court wrongly concluded the Kevin Stanford
and Heath Wilkins' matters, and wrongly allowed Kentucky and
Missouri to kill them for their criminal acts as children.
SECTION 1: CRUEL AND UNUSUAL PUNISHMENT
- Stanford v. Kentuckyj: The Facts
At seventeen years of age, Kevin Stanford and an accomplice
entered a gas station with felonious intent. Armed with a pistol,
Kevin took two gallons of fuel, 300 cartons of cigarettes and a small
amount of cash. The station's attendant was Kevin's neighbor. Ke-
vin and his accomplice raped, sodomized and executed her - Kevin
shot her in the face and in the back of her head. Later, Kevin
joked about the fact that he could have just beaten and bound her,
4 U.S. CONST. art. VI, § 2.
-7 492 U.S. 361.
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rather than killing her. The Kentucky court certified Kevin to be
tried as an adult and found him guilty of murder, first-degree sod-
omy and first-degree robbery, and sentenced him to death.
- Wilkins v. MissourP: The Facts
At sixteen years of age, Heath Wilkins robbed a convenience
store in Missouri. Heath stated that his intent was to kill whoever
witnessed the robbery because "a dead person can't talk".7 Unfor-
tunately, the store's owner witnessed the robbery and Heath re-
peatedly stabbed her to death. The court certified Heath to be
tried as an adult and convicted him of first-degree murder. At his
sentencing, Heath joined the state in requesting the death penalty.
He was successful in his prayer.
- The Supreme Court Reviews the Matters of Stanford and Wilkins
The Court considered these matters to address the question of
whether the imposition of the death penalty on sixteen- and seven-
teen-year-old individuals constituted cruel and unusual punish-
ment as prohibited by the Eighth Amendment. Under "original
intent" jurisprudence, the Court found that Kevin and Heath's
sentences were neither cruel nor unusual.
Original intent jurisprudence is a method of constitutional in-
terpretation in which the Court applies the meaning of a constitu-
tional passage as it was intended by its drafters and ratifiers. In this
interpretation, the Court asks, what did the drafter intend this pas-
sage to mean, under what historic and cultural contexts did the
ratifiers consider the passage, and where did the drafters and ra-
tifiers minds meet regarding this particular passage? On finding a
logical conclusion to these questions, the Court then rules on how
the present circumstances would be affected by the constitutional
passage as it was originally meant to apply.
The Court concluded that the drafters and ratifiers of the
Constitution intended the Eighth Amendment's meaning of "cruel
and unusual" to be an "evolving standard[ ] of decency that
mark[s] the progress of a maturing society".' This Court held that
the standard of "modern American society as a whole"' applies to
6 Id.
7 Id. at 366.
8 id. at 369 (quoting Trop v. DuIles, 36 U.S. 86, 101 (1958)(plurality opin-
ion) (Warren, CJ.)).
q Jd. at 369.
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the interpretation of the Eighth Amendment, with deference given
to the decisions of our state legislatures.
The Court found that only twelve states had prohibited the
sentence of death on offenders seventeen years of age or less, and
that a mere fifteen states refused to sentence offenders less than
age seventeen to death.' Holding that there was no consensus
among the states regarding the imposition of the death sentence
on children below eighteen but above sixteen, the Court con-
cluded that putting a child sixteen and seventeen years old to
death, for the crime of murder, was neither cruel nor unusual, and
that Missouri and Kentucky may execute Kevin and Heath."
- Thompson v. Oklahoma'2: Children Less Than Sixteen Years of
Age are Protected from Capital Punishment
The Court, in 1988, reviewed Oklahoma's capital sentence of
William Thompson, which presented the issue of capital punish-
ment as applied to an offender younger than sixteen. When Wil-
liam was fifteen-years-old, he participated, along with three other
people, in the murder of his brother-in-law. The victim was beaten,
cut, shot, murdered, chained to a concrete block, and then
dumped into a river. The state court certified William to stand trial
as an adult and convicted him of first-degree murder. Applying the
Eighth Amendment's "cruel and unusual" standard, the Supreme
Court held that the imposition of the death penalty on a person
who commits a capital offense while less than sixteen-years-old is
prohibited given "American sensibilit[ies]"."3 On this occasion,
the Court used American sensibilities as one standard of measure,
among many, in determining what is constitutionally cruel and
unusual.
SECrION II: THE EXECUTION OF CHILDREN AND CURRENT FEDERAL
AND STATE STATUTES
The death penalty is not imposed on criminals who commit
capital offenses in the federal or New York's jurisdiction, when the
criminal is less than age eighteen at the time of the commission of
the crime. Capital federal crimes have existed since 1790."M How-
ever, these laws were discretionary and were arbitrarily applied, a
10 492 U.S. at 370.
11 492 U.S. at 380.
12 487 U.S. 815.
13 Id. at 831.
14 See I Cong. Ch. 9, 1 Stat. 112 (1970).
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condition on capital punishment that the Court declares unconsti-
tutional in 1972.15 Congress amended the federal death penalty
statute, enacting the Continued Criminal Enterprise statutes"
(hereinafter "CCE") in 1988, and the Federal Death Penalty Act17
(hereinafter "FDPA") in 1994. Forty-six federal offenses now carry
capital penalties." The CCE provides that "[a] sentence of death
shall not be carried out upon a person who is under 18 years of age
at the time the crime was committed".' The FDPA provides that
"no person may be sentenced to death who was less than 18 years
of age at the time of the offense"..2'1 Although New York revived its
death penalty in 1995,21 its relevant portion provides that "the de-
fendant was more than eighteen years old at the time of the com-
mission of the crime" to be found guilty of murder in the first
degree.22
Justice Scalia noted in the Court's 1989 Stanford decision that
"37 states .. .permit capital punishment, 15 decline to impose it
upon 16-year-old offenders and 12 decline to impose it on 17-year-
old offenders." 21 These statistics have changed. As previously
noted, New York is now among the states that allow capital punish-
ment. Kentucky continues to allow children sixteen or above to be
executed for murder 24 if they are judicially certified to stand trial as
an adult. Missouri provides that persons less then sixteen will not
receive the death penalty whether or not they are certified as an
adult for trial. 5 Oklahoma provides that "[a]ny person thirteen
(13), fourteen (14), fifteen (15), sixteen (16), or seventeen (17)
years of age who is charged with murder in the first degree shall be
considered as an adult[ ,]"2 and that any person convicted of first-
degree murder will be executed. -7 Although the exact number of
jurisdictions that allow children found guilty of capital crimes to be
executed has changed, it remains true that many states either man-
15 See Furman %v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 277, 296, 389 (1972)(where the Court
required that standards of fairness and consistency be part of any capital offense to
meet Eighth Amendment scrutiny).16 See 21 U.S.C. 848(e)-(r) (1994).
"7 See 18 U.S.C. 3591-98 (1994).
18 See 110 Stat. 1214, 1286, 1292, 1296, 1330 (1996).
19 21 U.S.C. §848(1).
20 18 U.S.C. §3591(a) (1) (D).
21 N.Y. PENAL. LAW § 125.27 (McKinney 2001).
22 Id. at (1)(b).
23 492 U.S. at 370.
24 See Ky. REv. STAT. ANN. § 507.020 (Michie 1998).
25 See Mo. Rv. STAT. § 565.020 (Matthew Bender & Co. 1999).
26 OKLA. STAT. tit. 10, § 7306-1.1 (1999).
27 See OKI-A. STAT. tit. 21, § 701.9 (1999).
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date or allow a child who commits a capital offense at either six-
teen- or seventeen-years-of-age to be put to death.
SE(TION III: THE CONSTITUTION FORBIDS THE CAPITAL
PUNISHMENT OF CHILDREN
- A Child has a Constitutionally Protected Liberty Interest in Being
Safeguarded from Harm and Given the Opportunity to Reach
Maturity.
A state's denial of a citizen's fundamental rights is subject to
strict judicial review. The Court states that "basic in a democracy
[ ] stand[s] the interests of society to protect the welfare of chil-
dren [; and] it is the interest of youth itself, and of the whole com-
munity, that children be both safeguarded from abuses and given
opportunities for growth into free and independent well-developed
men and citizens."28
- The Court has Found that States Have A Compelling Interest and a
Constitutional Duty to Guide the Children in its Custody to
Maturity
The Court has found that the state has a compelling interest
in ". .. protect[ing] the welfare of children." 29 The Court has also
found a "high duty", rooted in common law, that "those who nur-
ture and direct [a child's] destiny. . .recognize and prepare [the
child] for [the] additional obligations [of maturity]."' The Court
explains that this "high duty" is an "affirmative process of teaching,
guiding, and inspiring.., the growth of young people into mature,
socially responsible citizens.""
When the state takes a child into its custody and assumes au-
thority over that child's destiny, the state also assumes the "high
duty" of guiding that child toward maturity as a socially responsible
citizen. The Court supports this construction of the state's duty
when it states the two "reasons why the constitutional rights of chil-
dren cannot be equated with those of adults are the peculiar vul-
nerability of children [and] their inability to make critical
decisions in an informed and mature manner. .. 2 The "peculiar
vulnerability" of a child causes those that assume authority over the
28 Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 165 (1944).
29 Id.
30 Pierce v. Soc. of Sisters of the Holy Names of Jesus & Mary, 268 U.S. 510, 535
(1925).
-1 Bellotti v. Baird, 443 U.S. 622, 638 (1979).
32 Id.
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child to take on an affirmative duty to protect that child from
harm, to act in the child's best interests and to guide the child's
growth to maturity. The child's inability to make informed and
mature decisions creates a liberty interest in receiving guidance
and protection from its custodian. When the state assumes control
over a child and detains him/her for trial, the state accepts these
"high duties", duties which counter its pursuit of putting that same
child to death, which is contrary to the child's liberty interest in
maturing, being protected from harm, and being guided in their
growth to maturity.
- TreatY Law, as the Supreme Law of the Land, Forbids the Execution
of Children and Protects them from Trial for Capital Offenses
The Constitution provides that, "[t]his Constitution, and the
Laws of the United States which shall be made in pursuance
thereof; and all treaties made, or which shall be made, under the
Authority of the United States, shall be the supreme Law of the
Land; and the Judges in every State shall be bound thereby, any
Thing in the Constitution or Laws of any State to the Contrary
notwithstanding."3 " The Court dictates that the Constitution is su-
preme or paramount to all other laws in this nation.
Congress ratified the International Covenant on Civil and Po-
litical Rights (ICCPR) on June 9, 1992. This treaty provides that
the "[s]entence of death shall not be imposed for crimes commit-
ted by persons below eighteen years of age . . ." (hereinafter "Anti-
Child-Execution Stipulation" or "ACES").15 The Vienna Conven-
tion on Treaties provides that, "[a] State may, when signing, ratify-
ing, accepting, approving or acceding to a treaty, formulate a
reservation unless.., the reservation is incompatible with the ob-
ject and purpose of the treaty."3" One of the overall objects and
purposes of the ICCPR is that "States ... shall promote the realiza-
tion of the [people's] right of self-determination ."..,,.7
The United States reserved its signature to the ICCPR. The
Senate's reservation stated: "[T] he United States reserves the right,
subject to its Constitutional constraints, to impose capital punish-
ment on any person (other than a pregnant woman) duly con-
33 U.S. CONST. art. N71, § 2.
34 Marburv v. Madison, 1 Cranch 137, 2 L.Ed. 60 (1803).
35 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, art. 6(5).
36 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, art. 19 (the United States has
signed, but not ratified, this treaty).
37 Supra note 35, at art. 1(3).
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victed . . . including . . .persons below eighteen years of age."3
This reservation is incompatible with the ICCPR's stated purpose
of promoting the realization of individual self-determination. Do-
mestically, children do not legally "realize" full self-determination
powers until their state recognizes them as fully competent citizens
at the age of eighteen. 39 The states have uniformly determined
that the age of general maturity is eighteen.4" States that impose
capital punishment on individuals whom the state, by statute, has
ruled do not possess the capacity of self-determination, are con-
trary to the fundamental goal of the ICCPR and ACES. Thus, the
United States' reservation on ACES is invalid as a matter of law.
International jurisprudence holds that customary interna-
tional law is at least equal to treaty law.4 ' Customary international
laws emerge from international norms under four criteria: (1)
opiniojuis; (2) duration, which may be satisfied even by short peri-
ods if generality and uniformity are indicated; (3) uniformity and
consistency of national practice; and (4) generality, meaning that
the norm is practiced worldwide rather than limited to a local
area. -4 2 The 1969 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties is the
controlling instrument regarding treaty formation. Although it is
an un-ratified treaty, it is customary international law and binding
on all nations.43
International legal norms may become a general principle of
law44 with the quality of jus cogens, which is defined as "a norm ac-
cepted and recognized by the international community of States as
a whole as a norm from which no derogation is permitted and
which can be modified only by a subsequent norm of a general
international law having the same character. '45 Pacta sunt servanda,
the principle that a nation honor its promises, is one of the fore-
most jus cogens principles. 46 The provisions of the Vienna Conven-
38 126 U.N. Doc. (1995).
39 Supra note 35.
40 487 U.S. at 839.
41 BURNS H. WESTON ET AL., INTERNATIONAL LAW AND WORLD ORDER 105 (3d. ed.
1997).
42 DAVID H. O-T, PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW IN THE MODERN WORLD 14-16 (1987);
see also Statute of the International Court of Justice, concluded June 26, 1945, art.
38(1) (B), 59 Star. 1031 (defines opinio juris as "a general [state] practice accepted as
[the] law" of nations) [hereinafter ICJ Statute].
43 1. A. SHEARER, STARKE'S INTERNATIONAL LA", 397 n.2 (11th ed. 1994)(the U.S.
Department of State recognizes the Vienna Convention as the "authoritative guide" to
treaty law and practice).
44 ICJ Statute, supra note 42.
45 Supra note 36, at art. 53.
46 Supra note 41, at 142.
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tion have attained jus cogens status, and would therefore be .so
fundamental that it invalidates [contrary] rules....
The United States, and its domestic states, became bound,
pacta sunt servanda, when our nation ratified the ICCPR. Further,
the Senate's reservation, which is contrary to ACES and the
ICCPR's explicit overall goal, violates the jus cogens principles of
the Vienna Convention, and is thus invalid.
- ACES is Applicable to the States as a Self-Executing Provision
The United States Supreme Court has determined that an in-
ternational obligation is binding domestically if it is either: (1) self-
executing; or (2) non-self-executing and supplemented with imple-
menting legislation.48 The federal government has not violated
ACES; the federal government has no capital crime applicable to
children. If ACES is found to be self-executing or non-self-execut-
ing but equipped with implementing legislation, then, under Arti-
cle Six as incorporated into state law through the Fourteenth
Amendment, our domestic states are also bound to honor it.
The ACES bears the marks of a self-executing treaty stipula-
tion. Chief Justice Marshall describes that a non-self-executing
treaty provision exists "when the terms, of the [treaty] stipulation
import a contract[, meaning] when either of the [state] parties
[have] engaged to perform a particular act[,] the treaty addresses
itself to political, not the judicial department; and the legislature
must execute the contract before it can become a rule for the
Court."'" Other types of treaty provisions are considered "self-exe-
cuting" and require no legislative action before they become do-
mestic law.5 °
The ACES is an agreement between States concerning human
rights. It is not a State agreement to perform just any act, but
rather, it is an agreement to withdraw children from consideration
for capital punishment. Moreover, ACES is directly addressed to
the judiciary, whose responsibility it is to try persons for crimes
committed.5
The Senate has declared that the ICCPR, Articles 1 - 7, which
47 MARK W. JANis, AN INTRODUCTION To INTERNATIONAL LAw 62 (2d ed. 1993).
48 Foster v. Neilson, 27 U.S. 253, 314 (1829).
49 WESTON, supra note 41, at 247 (quoting Foster v. Neilson, 27 U.S. (2 Pet.) 253,
314 (1829)).
50 Id.
51 U.S. CONST. art. III.
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include ACES, are not self-executing.5 2 However, this unilateral
declaration by the Senate has no legal effect. The judiciary is the
interpreter of the law, not the Senate .5 ' Neither the Supreme
Court, nor any lower court, has interpreted ACES as unenforceable
or limited its enforcement.
The U.S. Constitution endows a bicameral Congress, not the
Senate alone, with the power to make laws, including the rules of
the federal judiciary,54 and in enforcement of the "law of na-
tions". 5 These congressional acts also require presentment to the
President of the United States before taking on the force of law.5"
The record does not show that the House of Representatives
passed any similar bill regarding ACES, nor does it show that the
Senate passed any bill at all. The Senate only passed a resolution
declaring ACES non-self-executing. Unilateral Senate resolutions
do not form law. ACES is therefore self-executing because it has
the requisite self-executing characteristics and it is unhindered by
any judicial interpretation, domestic enforcement legislation, or
rule of the judiciary.
ACES creates a constitutional protection for citizens of the
United States comparable to those fundamental protections of the
Bill of Rights. Regarding treaties, the Constitution explicitly in-
structs that: ". . .Judges in every State shall be bound thereby, any
Thing in the . . . Laws of any State to the Contrary nonwithstand-
ing. ' 5 7 Further, the Fourteenth Amendment states that "[n]o State
shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or
immunities of the citizens of the United States; nor shall any State
deprive any person of life, liberty or property, without due process
of law. .. ,.
The ACES, a provision of the ICCPR, a ratified treaty, is not
burdened by any legal reservation or valid enforcement legislation;
it is the supreme law of the land subject only to the Constitution of
the United States and its interpretation. The ACES explicitly
grants citizens less than eighteen years of age immunity from trials
for capital crimes and from execution for their crimes. Article Six
52 138 CONO. Rlsc. S4781, 4783 (daily ed. Mar. 26, 1992) (statement of Sen.
Moynihan).
53 See Marbury v. Madison, 5 Cranch 137, 2 L.Ed. 60 (1803).
54 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 14 (which empowers Congress to make niles for the
government which includes the courts); see also U.S. CONST. art 1, § 8, cl. 9 and art. III,
§§ 1, 2 and 3.
55 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 10.
56 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 7, cl. 3.
57 U.S. CONST. art. VI, § 2.
58 U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
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of the U.S. Constitution explicitly directs the judges of every state
to enforce this treaty-based immunity, and the Fourteenth Amend-
ment directs that no state may enforce any law abridging it. The
supreme law of the land now forbids the execution of persons less
than eighteen years of age.
"It is well settled that.., if a law 'impinges upon a fundamen-
tal right explicitly or implicitly secured by the Constitution [it] is
presumptively unconstitutional.'"15
- Oklahoma, Missouri, Kentucky
and any other state that enforces, prosecutes or executes a minor
for a capital offense, acts in a presumptively unconstitutional and
illegal manner that violates the ACES, the ICCPR, and the Sixth
Article and Fourteenth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution.
- Certifying a Child to Stand Trial as an Adult is an Overbroad
Application of any State Interest which Denies the Child
Constitutional Liberties when he/she has not yet been
Found Guilty of any Crime
The reasons for the enforcement of criminal laws are: punish-
ment and retribution; 6° confinement and the protection of the
public from harms;"s' the deterrence of others from committing
like crimes;6 2 the rehabilitation of the wrongdoer;6" and restitution
for the victim.64 Criminal law is generally the province of the
states, and the state legislatures may each decide their own reasons
for criminal law enforcement. 1 When a state takes a delinquent
child into custody, it acts under its stated compelling interest in
criminal enforcement, while it also assumes the "high duty" and
interest of protecting and guiding the child to maturity, a duty that
includes rehabilitation. Every state in this nation has devised a ju-
venile system to meet different competing and compelling
interests. 6
59 Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. 297, 312 (1980) (citing, Mobile v. Bolden, 446 U.S. 55,
76 (1980)).
60 See generally IMMANUEl. KANT, THE PHILOSOPHY OF LAw (W. Hastic tr. 1887); see
also CAL. PENAL CODE § 1170 (West 2000).
61 MODEL PENAL CODE § 1.02 (1999); see also NY PENAL LAW § 1.05 (McKinney
1999).
62 Id.
63 Id.
64 Kelly v. Robinson, 479 U.S. 36 (1986).
65 Chapman v. U.S., 500 U.S. 453, 465 (1991)("a person who has been [] con-
victed [of a crime] is eligible for, and the court may impose, whatever punishment is
authorized by statute for his offense, so long as that penalty is not cruel and unusual
.. and so long as that penalty is not based on an arbitrary distinction that would
violate the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment.").
66 Thompson, 487 U.S. at 824.
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Certifying a child to stand trial as an adult in a capital offense
is overbroad. Although, a state may deny a person's constitutional
protections once convicted, as reason dictates, before conviction
the state may abridge the Constitution's protections only in the
most narrow manner as required to meet its compelling interests
or a pressing public need.67 Certifying a child to stand trial as an
adult for a capital crime is also overbroad as a deterrence because
children have been found to be incapable of making informed and
mature critical decisions." Therefore, they would not understand,
give attention to, or be deterred by another child's certification
proceedings.
Further, certifying a child to stand trial as an adult for a capital
crime is overbroad as a means of retribution and restitution, be-
cause the child has not been convicted and the state has yet to
prove that society or any victim has a right to punish or to take
value from the child. Certifying a child to stand trial as an adult for
a capital crime is also overbroad as rehabilitation because its result,
the possible sentence of death, is directly contrary to any rehabilita-
tive effort and contrary to the state's duty to protect and guide the
child. Certifying a child to stand trial as an adult for a capital
crime is not narrowly tailored to meet any state interest, much less
a compelling one, is a breach of the state's high duty, and is there-
fore unconstitutional.
CONCLUSION
A child has a constitutionally protected liberty interest in be-
ing safeguarded from harm and in being given the opportunity to
reach maturity. The Court has declared that the states have a com-
pelling interest in protecting the welfare of children, and that any
party having control of a child has a high duty to give the child
guidance towards adulthood. The state assumes this high duty
when it assumes the control and guidance over a defendant child.
The ICCPR, as a ratified treaty of the United States, is the su-
preme law of the land. Its ACES provision forbids the execution or
capital trial of children for their crimes. The Senate's reservation
regarding the ACES is not valid as a matter of the highest interna-
tional jus cogens laws. The Senate's interpretation that ACES is not
self-executing is beyond its competence because the Constitution
bestows the judiciary with competence to interpret the laws. Its in-
terpretation has not been enacted as a part of any treaty enforce-
67 Chapman, 500 U.S. at 465.68 Bellotti, 443 U.S. at 635.
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ment or judicial rules legislation. No American court has ever
interpreted the ACES in any manner. Therefore, no state judge
may impose the death penalty on a child because such a sentence
is unconstitutional. No state may enforce a death sentence, or
any law allowing a child to be prosecuted for an offense with a
capital penalty because such enforcement is presumptively
unconstitutional.
There is no state interest for which the trial or execution of a
child for a capital offense is narrowly tailored. Such state acts are
directly contrary to their "high duty" to protect and guide children
in their custody towards maturity. For these reasons, Kevin Stan-
ford and Heath Wilkins should be spared the death penalty, and
our present-day children should not legally be allowed to face a
trial in which their lives hang in the balance.

